INFERENCE PATH

The following ADEPT Inference Path™ is an alternative to diagramming the Barry George appeal that was discussed in the previous post and by Professor Peter Tillers.

Professor Peter Tillers posted a very interesting discussion on the appeal of the conviction for the murder of Jill Dando, a well-known BBC TV reporter. One of the pieces of circumstantial evidence at the trial was a single particle of firearm discharge residue found in the coat of the defendant. At the appeal, a forensic report was presented that asserted that the particle should have been given no probative weight.

The following is an ADEPT Inference Path™ argument map that presents a portion of the appellant’s argument. Notice that the supporting condition is necessary for the soundness of the inference path.

Dr. David B. Resnik (bioethicist and vice-chair of the Institutional Review Board for Human Subjects Research at the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, National Institutes of Health) discusses the problems of conflicts of interest in scientific research in his new book “The Price of Truth, How Money Affects the Norms of Science.” http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780195309782/acprof-9780195309782-chapter-9.html; see also http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/archives/all/COILegalProceedings.html . Understanding “critical questions” (assumption or conditions) and the argument visualization syntax of these special premises is helpful to effectively consider such conflicts of interest in scientific research.

In presenting his case, Dr. Resnik first sets out the ethical principles of scientific research:

• Honesty
• Carefulness
• Objectivity
• Openness
• Freedom
• Credit
• Respect for intellectual property
• Respect for colleagues and students
• Respect for research subjects
• Competence
• Confidentiality
• Legality
• Social Responsibility
• Stewardship of resources (p. 45).

These ethical areas can be at risk, according to Dr. Resnik, when there are “temptations of money, power, success, and prestige, as well as financial, institutional, social or political pressures” that can compromise judgment. (p. 110)

This is why an assessment of the probative force of scientific research (or other studies) must consider these “critical questions” that can be represented as assumptions or conditions. For example, consider the following ADEPT™ Inference Path argument map drawn from Dr. Resnik’s work:

This map illustrates the importance of being always aware of the presence or absence of this type of assumption based on the relevant critical questions. This awareness is enhanced with the ADEPT™ Inference Path visual syntax because the absence of such assumptions is always apparent due to the different syntax for inferential premises and their supporting assumptions that are visually depicted underneath.

To the contrary, this distinction is not reflected in the typical (i.e, pyramid rather than path) visual language syntax used for Rationale™ argument mapping software. Both types of premises are lumped together in the row of blocks. Thus, the pyramid syntax does not cue the designer or reader that essential elements of the argument may not be represented.

For example, the Austhink report “WHY TANKS? WHY ABRAMS?, The application of argument mapping to a contentious public policy debate“, relies heavily on three published reports, namely the 2000 White Paper, the 2006 Adaptive Campaigning, and the Future Land Operations Concept. Yet, none of the critical questions of possible conflicts of interest related to these publications are depicted in the argument maps or examined in the report.

While I am sure that there is a sound explanation for their absence, the problem created by the pyramid visual syntax is that the reader of the report is not aware that the essential assumptions of a lack of conflicts of interest are missing from the analysis. A reader cannot fully assess the probative force of an argument without considering all the essential components of that argument.

Early in this term, in my Masters class in Criminal Justice, a student talked about a generalization of a juror. I quickly created this argument map to explain one perspective of the nature of an argument so that we could first share the same argument terminology and, more importantly, the same metaphor of an argument.

Now all the students in the class can more accurately conceptualize the nature of an argument and dialogue about it with concrete terms:

• “reaching the conclusion,”
• “inference steps,”
• “essential supporting conditions,”
• “the probative strength of the (stepping stone) premises,”
• “leading the judge to their conclusion,”
• “not following their reasoning,”
• “where does their reasoning end,”
• “not losing the jury,”
• “a weak argument,”
• “a premise being irrelevant because it either does not lead to the conclusion or it does not support a premise that does lead to a conclusion,”
• “too big an inference leap, etc.”

Even if I never draw another map again this term, this one inference path map keeps the students and I in the same territory (i.e., domain).

The lack of a sufficiently strong isomorphic connection to arguments in Rationale™ pyramid or other more abstract argument visual languages was one of my main frustrations with using them.

THE HUMAN MIND SEEMS TO HAVE LITTLE TOLERANCE for the unknown. As a result, it shows a natural tendency to interpret the mysterious [arguments] within the referential frame of the familiar. The mind attempts to understand the unknown based on the known, and the new based on the old. In order to accomplish this, it resorts to metaphorical and isomorphic analogies. http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=APA.030.0509A.

If the teacher does not provide a functional and memorable analogy, the students will attempt to come up with one of their own. And if it is not sufficiently isomorphic, they will get lost.

Rationale™ pyramid visual language certainly uses a metaphor. As Dr. Tim van Gelder states:

The dominant metaphor, one that’s highly visible even though it is not “in your face”, is the notion of a block. Rationale (like Reason!Able before it) helps people deal with abstract notions like argumentation through the metaphor of building blocks in the kindergarten. It is saying, in effect: think of a complex argument as like a pile of blocks. Each claim in the argument is a block. Blocks lower down in the pile support blocks higher in the pile. There’s one block sitting at the very top. There are green blocks and red blocks, and in fact these are themselves made up of blocks (analysis mode). Blocks can be moved around, and they basically stay where they’re put, except when they are pushed aside by other blocks (auto-layout).

Building blocks are very basic as metaphors – more basic than, say, files and folders (within folders within…). We think that our use of the blocks metaphor is part of why Rationale is so easy to use. (Another part is that our team includes people who obsess about making things easy to use.) But in adopting the blocks metaphor, we weren’t trying to make Rationale easy to use. Rather, our intent was to make arguments easy to use, so to speak. We were trying to make complex reasoning and argumentation easier to understand, and the corresponding skills easier to master.

So metaphors can play at least two different kinds of roles in software, and sometimes they will play both roles simultaneously. They can help users figure out how to use the software, and they can help users figure out the domain. It may be especially true that the dominant metaphors are simultaneously playing both roles in software, like Rationale, which has as a primary purpose helping people understand the domain, as opposed to software which assumes people understand the domain and just want to help people do work in that domain.

Correctly understanding the domain of argument is crucial. The more isomorphic the metaphor, the better that understanding will be.