INFERENCE PATH

The following argument map is the final draft filed with the state supreme court as discussed in the last post.

As discussed in the previous post today, I am filing an appellate brief this week in the state supreme court using argument maps based on the Rationale™ path visual language with the ADEPT™ model of inference (argument defeasible essential predication transitivity.) This map reflects the different depiction of transitive premises and supporting conditions or assumptions. Rationale™ pyramid fails to make this important distinction resulting in ambiguity in the distinctive nature of the premises.

In the state supreme court this week, I am filing an appellate brief. This brief uses the following argument map to lead the supreme court along a path of transitive statutory stepping stones to the conclusion that the appeal must be dismissed. The argument map uses the Rationale™ path visual language based on the ADEPT™ model of inference (argument essential predication transitivity.) ADEPT™ provides the most efficient connection between the premises and the conclusion. This directness and lack of redundancy are important in litigation where it can be easy for the judge or juror to get lost or distracted.

When translating a prose argument into an argument map, fidelity in translation is crucial in litigation. This is why it is essential that an argument visual language has sufficient expressiveness. A mismatch in semantic range between the prose and the visual language can result in confusion in the judge or jury.

For example, the visual language Rationale™ pyramid can create such confusion because it lacks sufficient expressiveness in depicting objections. The Austhink tutorial describes objections as depicted in Rationale™ pyramid:

“Objections and reasons are very similar; it is just that while reasons present evidence supporting the contention, objections present evidence against it. Roughly, an objection ’says why the contention wouldn’t be true.’” “Technically, an objection is [a] set of claims working together to provide evidence that another claim is false.” http://www.austhink.com/reason/tutorials/Tutorial_1/3_Objections/objections.htm 

The obvious problem is that an objection to a claim in litigation is not always that the claim is “false.” Such a limited bivalent (i.e., true or false) expressiveness does not account for other possible types of objections. For example, a more rich list of possible objections to a claim could include (WAVICIF):

• Weak
• Ambiguous
• Vague
• Inconsistent
• Conditional
• Irrelevant (This is different that arguing that a co-premise is false making the other co-premise with no objection attached irrelevant.)
• False

To illustrate the lack of sufficient objection expressiveness in Rationale™ pyramid, an objection from the Austhink Consulting report “Why Tanks? Why Abrams?” will be used.

What is the claim to which this objection (consisting co-premises 1A-a and 1A-b) applies? One indicator of a problem is that the claim objected to is not obvious. In this instance, this uncertainty is caused by more than just a lack of expressivenss in the visual language.

First, this particular objection lacks inferential rigor. The two premises are not co-premises that need each other to connect to a claim. The application of the No Danglers rule makes that apparent. This lack of rigor can also be seen in the actual map.

While the visual language indicates that the co-premises should support the falsity of the claim, namely, “The Abrams M1A1 AIM is not too heavy to be used in the soft terrain of the Asia-Pacific region,” the prose of the co-premises suggests a more nuanced objection. For example, co-premise 1A-a indicates that the concept “heaviness” is not determinative of the tank’s suitability in soft terrain. This lack of congruence between the visual language and the prose could cause confusion in the judge or juror.

In this example, there are a number of possible solutions. First, the claim that the tank is not too heavy, although not supported by the above co-premises, is actually a good one as shown below.

The more fundamental problem with the design of the visual language Rationale™ pyramid is that it does not permit the claim that is actually supported by the objection to be explicitly stated. Rationale™ path resolves this deficit in expressiveness.

Other visual languages such as the ones used with Carneades and Araucaria are similarly limited in expressiveness. To the contrary, the Inference Path visual language relying on the ADEPT™ (i.e., argument defeasible essential predication transitivity) model of inference has the requisite expressiveness.

A previous post in this blog discusses the risk in leaving some premises implicit in an argument map. This post uses another example drawn from Austhink Consulting’s recent report to help illustrate this risk. (I use this report because it is one of the finest examples of the power of argument mapping.)

The argument maps in the report were created with Rationale™ software using the typical argument mapping visual language (i.e., pyramid). The graphical conventions of pyramid permit implicit inferential premises. This lack of strict scaffolding permits an argument pyramid to be inadvertently designed with a faulty structure.

In contrast, an argument map created with Rationale™ using path does not permit an argument with a faulty structure. The reason is that path relies upon an interlocking premise structure that cannot be built with implicit inferential premises. This structure uses an inference method called “argument essential predication transitivity” ( ADEPT™ ). In litigation using a reasoning process that reduces risk of error is a sound decision.

A portion of Austhink Consulting’s argument mapping is shown below.  p. 45.                                    
                                         

An application of the no danglers rule indicates that the terms “combat weight” and “sound decision” are danglers. This is a clue that there might be a problem. Trying to fit the premises into a path structure illuminates the problem.

The first step is to shift to a left-to-right orientation and place first in order the premise whose subject is the same as the subject of the main conclusion.

The next step is to insert the predicate of the main conclusion as the predicate of the second inferential premise and to make space for the interlocking subject of that second inferential premise.

The next step is to insert the subject of the second inferential premise as an appropriate transitive match for the predicate of the first inferential premise.

This process reveals that, as structured in the Austhink Consulting report, premise 1A-a, as shown in the first map above, does not link or connect the other premise to the main conclusion. The two premises do not work together. This is a flaw in the reasoning structure as depicted in the argument map in the report.

This flaw in visual representation comes at a critical point in the argument. The reason is that the “pivotal claim” intended to be represented is “that maintaining the tank capability was necessary if our Army was to have the ‘combat weight’ to achieve its mission without undue risk.” p. 44. The following path map illustrates one possible correct version of the inferential relationships as indicated by the narrative. The path map below could be translated back into a pyramid map by adding redundant premises.

As this layer of the pyramid map is corrected, every layer beneath it will also need adjustment so that each premise acting as support is properly worded and placed correctly in the inferential network.

The above process was performed to illustrate the nature of using argument maps in litigation. Litigation is about two adversaries engaged in conflict with the goal of each of the parties to persuade the judge or jury. This context necessitates that in preparing a trial exhibit every single element be tested for an anticipated attack intended to reduce its credibility. Of course, in litigation, the opposing party then has an opportunity to show how that effort was itself flawed. Unlike in litigation, I always welcome such replies in this collegial atmosphere since understanding, not winning, is the goal. This process of ongoing critical examination will, hopefully, advance the art of argument mapping to everyone’s benefit.

In litigation, presenting argument maps with implicit premises (i.e., enthymemes) is often appropriate. But it can be risky. Without the scaffolding that comes from depiciting all the premises, arguments may appear to the judge to lack sufficient rigor and precision. Or they may just appear to be confusing with the nature of the inference unclear.

A portion of an argument map from an Austhink Consulting report titled “Why Tanks? Why Abrams?” helps illustrate this risk. (I highly recommend reading this report. It is the most effective, dynamic, and innovative use of argument mapping for a large scale project that I have ever seen. I will enjoy and benefit from studying it for years to come. It is one of the best “arguments” for the power of argument mapping.)

The following map is the top tier of a large comprehensive map from the report which presents its final conclusion and most general reason. Based on the explanation of the visual grammar of this map, claims 1A-a and 1A-b are intended to represent two co-premises that comprise a single reason. But a quick examination of them reveals, in my opinion, that this is not so. The two co-premises are actually portions of two separate reasons. This is obvious because the Rabbit and Holding Hands rules are not followed. There are missing premises.

Based on claim 1A-a, the other co-premise need only state that “buying the Abrams tanks was buying new tanks” to complete a single reason. In fact, buying any of the competing tanks (i.e., Leopard 2 and Challenger 2) could also be valid co-premises resulting in their purchases as “sound decisions” as shown below.

This example illustrates the confusion that can result from not making explicit all the co-premises. The narrative in the report confirms that there are two separate reasons. It concluded that “[t]he decision to buy new Abrams A1M1 AIM tanks…was sound. p. 5. It was sound because buying new tanks was a sound decision (to maintain tank capability.) And “in maintaining that capability,” buying the Abrams tanks was sound because they were a better buy for the Army than any other available tank would have been. p. 5.

So one approach would be to consider these two claims as part of two separate reasons as shown below. (An essential predication transitivity map is also depicted.)

But an examination of the narrative suggests a different argument map. The first claim (i.e., A1-a) provides no diagnosticity to distinguish between the three available tanks. Buying any of them would have been a “sound decision. So either there are two final conclusion: “Buying Abrams was a sound decision. And buying Abrams was the soundest decision.” Or more likely, there is just one final conclusion: ”Buying Abrams was the soundest decision.” And a supporting (non-inferential) assumption is that “the purchase of new tanks (in general) was a sound decision.” This argument structure is shown below.

These examples illustrate why using essential predication transitivity always avoids this potential lack of clarity that can result from using other argument structures. There are never implicit inferential premises with an essential predication transitivity approach. (There may be differing degrees of granularity.) And the linkage between the co-premises is always obvious. In litigation, such precision and clarity is essential.